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In United States v. Wright, issued June 2013, the Sixth 
Circuit cited a supposed consensus among circuit courts 
that Internet bans are per se unreasonably broad sentences 
in electronic child pornography possession and distribution 
cases. This Article demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s 
claim of a consensus is mistaken. While some circuit courts 
of appeal have limited judicial sentencing discretion when 
it comes to imposing Internet bans, many more have not 
imposed this limit. Despite this lack of consensus, in cases 
where such bans are challenged, most courts make their 
decisions partly based on either the Internet’s pervasive 
importance in modern society or its capacity for rapid 
change. Though the claim of a consensus is incorrect, 
pointing to the Internet’s unique qualities, especially its 
pervasive importance, remains a compelling argument. 
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In June 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Wright1 pinpointed an area of 
law where the ubiquity of technology could limit a court’s 
discretion: the sentencing of convicted criminals.2 In its holding, 
the court emphasized that “there appears to be a consensus that 
Internet bans are unreasonably broad for defendants who possess 
or distribute child pornography,” as opposed to those who “initiate 
or facilitate the victimization of children” over the Internet.3 An 
Internet ban is a court-imposed condition on an defendant’s post-
incarceration release that prohibits the person from using or 
possessing a computer, Internet, or Internet-compatible device for 
a designated or indeterminate period of time, without (or regardless 
of) a supervisory body’s prior consent—usually that of a probation 
officer.4 To stand, the condition must be reasonably related to the 
general purposes of criminal punishment and not be overly broad 
or unduly restrictive.5 A consensus on what constitutes an 
1 529 Fed. Appx. 553 (6th Cir. 2013).  
2 Id. at 557-58.  
3 Id. (quoting United States v. Lantz, 443 Fed. Appx. 135, 144 (6th Cir. 
2011) (quoting United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Wiedower, 634 F.3d 490, 492 (8th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001).   
5 See generally United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 126-27 (5th Cir. 
2011) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3853 (2008)). 
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unreasonably broad sentence would limit courts’ ability to sentence 
as they see fit.   
This potential intrusion into federal trial courts’ discretion 
began when the circuits split over whether to express per se 
disapproval of some Internet bans as probation or parole 
conditions.6 In the realm of crimes involving the electronic 
possession or distribution of child pornography, the D.C. Circuit 
said, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that there existed a national 
consensus that some Internet bans are per se unreasonable.7 The 
argument for limiting trial courts’ discretion was that the Internet is 
so important to modern life that any sort of ban would be 
unreasonable.8 However, another argument soon appeared in favor 
of allowing a complete ban. This second argument favors a ban 
because of the changing nature of technology and the courts’ need 
for flexibility in sentencing.9 This Article will demonstrate that 
there is no consensus and that both technology arguments remain 
compelling. Furthermore, this Article will show that the argument 
concerning the Internet’s importance specifically, with its 
longevity and variations, is likely to be the more compelling of the 
two for practitioners with clients facing Internet bans.10 
 
I. THE BASICS: CHALLENGING SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS 
 
The criminal justice system punishes convicted defendants as 
retribution for their acts, to deter future crimes, and to reform the 
defendant.11 In an attempt to meet these objectives, Congress has 
enacted statutes that guide a court’s sentencing generally.12 With 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 168-70 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. 
Borders, 489 Fed. Appx. 858, 863-64 (6th Cir. 2012). 
7 Wright, 529 Fed. Appx. at 557-58. 
8 See id. at 557. 
9 See infra Part III.C. 
10 It is important to acknowledge the traditional First Amendment argument 
made in child pornography possession and distribution cases as outlined and 
discussed in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-51 (2002). 
This Article will not address that freedom of speech argument. 
11 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 1 (15th ed. 2013). 
12 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (2010).  
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regard to a convicted defendant’s supervised release, Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3583, originally ratified in 1984. Throughout 
its life, this statute has mandated factors and limitations that courts 
must consider and follow when imposing release conditions.13 
Read with the more general federal criminal statutes, courts 
interpret § 3583 as requiring release conditions to be “reasonably 
related” to certain factors and interests.14 Conditions must relate to 
“(1) the nature and characteristics of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the deterrence of criminal 
conduct, (3) the protection of the public,” or “(4) the provision of 
needed . . . correctional treatment [for] the defendant.”15 A 
condition can be related to any or all of these factors but it must be 
reasonably related to at least one,16 and “the condition cannot 
impose any ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
necessary.’”17 
For an appellate court to analyze whether a release condition is 
reasonably related to the statutory factors and interests, the lower 
court’s imposition must be “ripe for review.”18 Traditionally, a 
sentencing issue is ripe when the defendant “has suffered a 
concrete and particularized injury” because of the imposition.19 
Thus, in the case of release conditions, there is sometimes debate 
as to ripeness when a condition is imposed but not yet experienced 
by the defendant.20 However, the sentencing statute’s legislative 
history, the inapplicability of “traditional canons that counsel 
against hearing these sorts of challenges,” and a judicial interest in 
hearing these cases expeditiously all favor review of supervised 
13 18 U.S.C. § 3853 (2008). 
14 United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 126 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United 
States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
15 Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153. 
16 Miller, 665 F.3d at 126 (citing Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153 n.1). 
17 Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153 (quoting in part 18 U.S.C. § 3853 (2008)).   
18 United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2001). 
19 United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1434 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also White, 
244 F.3d at 1202 (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 
(1967) (abrogated on unrelated grounds)). 
20 Compare Rhodes, 552 F.3d at 629 (finding condition unripe for review), 
with White, 244 F.3d at 1203 (finding condition ripe for review). 
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release conditions “at the time of their imposition.”21 Absent a 
condition “full of contingency and abstraction,” the condition is 
likely to be reviewable when the court first imposes it.22 
When the appellate court reviews a sentence, it gives “due 
deference” to the sentencing court’s decisions.23 This deference 
amounts to respecting the sentencing court’s wide or broad 
discretion.24 Therefore, upon appeal, a condition of release like 
Internet bans can be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.25 
One court aptly defines an abuse of discretion as when a 
sentencing court “fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, 
gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or 
considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of 
judgment in weighing those factors.”26 
If, however, the defendant does not object to the condition’s 
imposition, then the reviewing court reviews the objection on 
appeal for plain error.27 Under this standard of review, most courts 
will only find reversible error if “(1) an error occurred, (2) the 
error was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights.”28 
Some federal appellate courts go even further and add a fourth 
requirement for reversal: that the error affected “the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”29 With 
these standards, plain error review subjects the sentencing court’s 
actions to a lesser degree of scrutiny than the abuse of discretion 
standard.30 Therefore, when challenging a supervised release 
21 White, 244 F.3d at 1203 (citing United States v. Loy, 237F.3d 251, 258 
(3d Cir. 2001)). 
22 Rhodes, 552 F.3d at 628-629. 
23 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also Miller, 665 F.3d at 
126. 
24 United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 
United States v. Henkel, 358 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2004)).  
25 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
26 Wiedower, 634 F.3d at 493 (quoting United States v. Asalati, 615 F.3d 
1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
27 United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). 
28 Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 
2002)). 
29 Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999) (quoting United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Schuler, 206 Fed. Appx. 748, 749 (10th Cir. 
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condition, a timely objection should affect the court’s review of the 
sentence’s reasonableness under the statutes. 
 
II. THE CONSENSUS AND DISSENSION 
 
The Second and Fifth Circuits most clearly evidence the circuit 
split on the issue of Internet bans in electronic child pornography 
possession and distribution cases.31 In United States v. Sofsky,32 
the Second Circuit clearly articulated its position. In that case, the 
defendant pled guilty to electronically receiving child pornography 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252. As a condition of release, he was 
barred from using a computer or the Internet without approval (an 
incomplete ban).33 Under plain error review, the court struck down 
the condition as unreasonable.34 This decision became firm 
precedent in the Second Circuit, rendering Internet bans per se 
unreasonable.35  
The Sofsky decision starkly contrasted with the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding less than a year earlier in United States v. Paul.36 In Paul, 
2006). 
31 See Jake Adkins, Unfriended Felons: Reevaluating the Internet’s Role for 
the Purpose of Special Condition in Sentencing in a Post-Facebook World, 9 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 263, 264-68 (2011); Brian W. McKay, Guardrails 
on the Information Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the 
Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 203, 221-24 (2003); see also 
Sam Cowin, You Don’t Have Mail: The Permissibility of Internet-Use Bans in 
Child Pornography Cases and the Need for Uniformity Across the Circuits, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 885, 897-900 (2012) (focusing on the Eleventh Circuit but 
citing to the Fifth as well to contrast the Second); Laura Tatelman, Give Me 
Internet or Give Me Death: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Internet 
Restrictions as a Condition of Supervised Release for Child Pornography 
Offenders, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 431, 436 (2014) (saying that the Fifth 
Circuit “upheld even the most extreme total ban on internet access” and that 
“United States v. Sofsky is often cited as a leading case in invalidating total 
prohibitions”). 
32 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002). 
33 Id. at 124. 
34 Id. at 125-26. 
35 United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 386 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Cowin, supra note 
31, at 901. 
36 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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the defendant pled guilty to one count of electronically possessing 
child pornography, a lesser offense than receipt.37 Upon release 
from prison, the sentencing court barred him from accessing the 
Internet.38 Under abuse of discretion review, the appellate court 
upheld the condition as reasonable, despite the fact that the ban did 
not allow for Internet use even with prior approval (a complete 
ban).39 
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Paul holding in subsequent 
years. In United States v. Brigham,40 the Fifth Circuit upheld a 
complete ban on computer and Internet use when the defendant 
was convicted of one count of receiving child pornography.41 
Similarly, in 2011 and 2013, the Fifth Circuit upheld, under abuse 
of discretion review, incomplete Internet bans in cases where the 
defendants’ most severe charge was transporting child 
pornography, a crime carrying the same potential sentence as 
receipt of child pornography.42 In the 2011 case, United States v. 
Miller,43 the Fifth Circuit discussed the “consensus” mentioned by 
the Sixth Circuit’s Wright court and, in the end, decided not to join 
the consensus.44 The Fifth Circuit instead chose not to strip district 
courts of their ability to restrict Internet use in some cases; rather, 
it wanted to maintain the sentencing courts’ “broad discretion.”45 
This initial split led to a messy fracturing of the circuits. Now 
the circuits can essentially be divided into three groups: those in 
agreement with the Second Circuit (those with per se disapproval 
of some Internet bans); those incorrectly labeled as agreeing with 
the Second Circuit (those that cannot be said to have per se 
disapproval of any Internet bans despite counterclaims); and those 
in agreement with the Fifth Circuit (those with no per se approach 
37 Id. at 157 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (1998)). 
38 Paul, 274 F.3d at 160. 
39 Id. at 170. 
40 569 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2009). 
41 Id. at 223-24, 234-35. 
42 United States v. Taylor, No. 12-10913, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Sept. 13, 
2013); United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 117, 126, 128 (5th Cir. 2011); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2011). 
43 Miller, 665 F.3d at 114. 
44 Id. at 128-33. 
45 Id. at 132. 
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to Internet bans). This division leaves only three circuits adhering 
to the view that an Internet ban is per se unreasonable in certain 
cases: the Second, Third, and Seventh circuits. Such a small 
fraction—three of twelve—is not a consensus.     
 
A.  Shared Per Se Disapproval: Second,  
Third, and Seventh Circuits 
 
Courts have cited the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits as members of this “consensus,” sharing a per se 
disapproval of Internet bans.46 However, only the Third and 
Seventh circuits clearly disapprove of complete Internet bans.47 
The Third Circuit aligned with the Second Circuit by similarly 
striking down even incomplete Internet bans imposed on people 
convicted of receiving child pornography.48 Likewise, the Seventh 
Circuit aligned with the Second Circuit when it struck down an 
Internet ban in a child pornography possession case while 
upholding a ban in a case where the defendant used the Internet to 
facilitate the victimization of children.49 However, the other three 
circuits listed, the First, Eighth, and Tenth, cannot be said to agree 
46 United States v. Borders, 489 Fed. Appx. 858, 863-64 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(citing United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (articulating the 
original consensus assertion (Love consensus), which included the Third Circuit 
in the consensus though the Borders court did not). 
47 See infra notes 48-49; see also United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 
197-98 (3d Cir. 2011) (synthesizing the Circuit’s case law and re-emphasizing 
how complete Internet bans are rarely sufficiently tailored and that direct harm 
to a child, or the “live component,” makes a difference to the analysis). 
48 Compare United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 2010) 
[hereinafter Miller (3d)], and United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 149-50 
(3d Cir. 2007), and United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003), 
with United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 278 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding 
an incomplete Internet ban when defendant used “technologies to facilitate, 
entice, and encourage the real-time molestation of a child”), and United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a ban when the 
defendant used the Internet to develop a sexual relationship with a child). 
49 Compare United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2003), 
with United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 2010) (differentiating 
the mere possession in Holm from the electronic possession and facilitation of 
child exploitation in this case). 
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with these circuits’ holdings. 
 
B.  The Mislabeled: First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
 
The First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have cases that appear to 
agree with the Second’s precedent, but those cases are 
distinguishable or the court has since moved away from what 
appeared to be a per se disapproval. The First Circuit case that the 
D.C. and Sixth circuits cited to as evidence of its joining the 
consensus is United States v. Perazza-Mercado,50 in which the 
defendant pled guilty to engaging in sexual misconduct with one of 
his minor students.51 Under abuse of discretion review, the First 
Circuit struck down as unreasonable a supervised release condition 
barring the defendant from using the Internet at home.52 However, 
this outcome does not signify the First Circuit’s adherence to the 
Second Circuit’s approach. The defendant never used the Internet 
to commit the act, making any Internet-based condition baseless. 
Also, the crime constituted physical contact,53 which, under Sofsky, 
would warrant a ban. With just the Perazza-Mercado holding, it is 
uncertain whether the First Circuit will join the Second Circuit 
because it has not elected to comment on complete Internet bans in 
a relevant, published case since that decision.54 To consider the 
First Circuit part of the consensus on the basis of Perazza-Mercado 
would be incorrect. 
As for the Eighth and Tenth circuits, placing them in the 
“consensus” would be similarly incorrect. The Eighth Circuit was 
considered part of the consensus because of its holdings in United 
States v. Crume55 and United States v. Boston.56 In Crume, the 
50 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009). 
51 Id. at 66-67. See also Borders, 489 Fed. Appx. at 864 (including the First 
Circuit in the Love consensus because of this case). 
52 Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d at 70-74. 
53 Id. at 67. 
54 See Robin Miller, Validity of Condition of Probation, Supervised Release, 
or Parole Restricting Computer Use or Internet Access, 4 A.L.R. 6th 1, §§ 4, 11, 
12, 15 (2005) (other First Circuit cases either did not address the issue or were 
unrelated to child exploitation convictions). 
55 422 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005). 
56 494 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 
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court struck down an incomplete ban under abuse of discretion 
review when the defendant was charged with electronic possession 
of child pornography.57 The court did so because the condition 
could have been more narrowly tailored to allow Mr. Crume some 
access to what is “such an important medium.”58 In Boston, the 
court upheld, under abuse of discretion review, an incomplete 
Internet ban when the defendant sexually exploited a minor in 
addition to electronically possessing and receiving child 
pornography.59  
These cases might have signaled alignment with the Second 
Circuit because the Eight Circuit disapproved of the ban in certain 
instances. However, some years later in United States v. Morais,60 
the Eighth Circuit upheld an incomplete Internet ban under abuse 
of discretion review when the defendant pled guilty to two counts 
of receiving child pornography.61 In so holding, the court diverged 
from the Second Circuit’s per se disapproval. Specifically, the 
Eight Circuit held that to prohibit a district court from ever 
imposing “a prior-approval Internet use restriction based on a 
defendant’s receipt and possession of child pornography . . . would 
be in tension with [the circuit’s] cases holding that a district court 
should fashion conditions of supervised release on an 
individualized basis . . . .”62 If the fashioning of conditions is based 
on the individualized facts of each case, what consensus can ever 
exist? With so overt a statement, the Eighth Circuit can no longer 
be considered a subscriber to per se disapproval. 
Like the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits cite the 
Tenth Circuit as being in agreement with the Second because of its 
holding in United States v. White.63 In White, without stating a 
12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing to Crume and Boston). 
57 Crume, 422 F.3d at 733. 
58 Id. 
59 Boston, 494 F.3d at 667–68. 
60 670 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
61 Id. at 891, 895-96. 
62 Id. at 896; see also United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 764 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (upholding an incomplete Internet ban in a child pornography 
possession case). 
63 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Borders, 
489 Fed. Appx. 858, 863-64 (6th Cir. 2012) (including the Tenth Circuit in the 
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standard of review, the Tenth Circuit struck down a complete 
Internet ban after the defendant was convicted of receiving 
electronic child pornography.64 The court struck the condition in 
part because it was “overly broad.”65 The holding in White, 
however, should be read in tandem with United States v. Walser,66 
another Tenth Circuit opinion issued later that year. In Walser, the 
Tenth Circuit, under plain error review, upheld an incomplete 
Internet ban when the defendant was convicted of one count of 
possessing electronic child pornography.67 In Walser, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the incomplete condition had solved the problem 
in White and, in so holding, did not clearly state when an 
incomplete Internet ban would be per se unreasonable.68 The Tenth 
Circuit has not directly addressed this issue since Walser, decided 
thirteen years ago.69 But in light of Walser, the Tenth Circuit, like 
the First and the Eighth, should not be considered in agreement 
with the Second Circuit’s per se disapproval. 
 
C.  Shared Approval: Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,  
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
 
The remaining circuits cannot be said to be part of the shared 
per se disapproval because of their silence or their holdings, and 
therefore they necessarily join the Fifth Circuit in avoiding a per se 
approach. The Fourth and D.C. circuits have yet to directly address 
the issue.70 The Sixth Circuit, by its holding in Wright, joined the 
Love consensus because of this case). 
64 White, 244 F.3d at1201. 
65 Id. at 1206. 
66 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001). 
67 Id. at 985, 987-88. 
68 Id. at 988. 
69 See Miller, supra note 54 (other cited cases were unrelated to electronic 
child exploitation convictions). 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (striking down the complete ban in a facilitation case but maintaining that 
incomplete Internet bans are “perhaps unreasonably broad for defendants who 
possess or distribute child pornography.”); United States v. Smathers, 351 Fed. 
Appx. 801, 802 (4th Cir. 2009) (striking an Internet ban when underlying 
exploitation of minor offense had nothing to do with the Internet); United States 
v. Granger, 117 Fed. Appx. 247, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding an 
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Fifth Circuit when it upheld, under abuse of discretion review, an 
incomplete Internet ban after convictions for possessing and 
receiving child pornography on a computer.71 Though the 
defendant in Wright had no prior convictions, the Sixth Circuit 
found the condition reasonable.72 Likewise, the Ninth and Eleventh 
circuits joined the Fifth Circuit by upholding incomplete Internet 
bans, under abuse of discretion review, when the defendant was 
charged with electronic possession or receipt of child 
pornography.73 These six circuits, either not yet issuing a decision 
or overtly defying the Sofsky holding, cannot be said to subscribe 
to the Second Circuit’s per se disapproval of Internet bans. Adding 
the three circuits that are mislabeled—the First, Eighth, and 
Tenth—to these six circuits, this shared per se disapproval of 
Internet bans, this “consensus,” does not exist.   
 
III. TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT 
 
Without a national consensus that Internet bans are 
impermissible, the arguments for the importance of the Internet to 
modern life and the ever-changing nature of the Internet have both 
gained respect from some courts.74 As one academic says, the 
Internet is so important that “banks, news outlets, and schools now 
offer many of their services exclusively online.”75 Indeed, the 
Second Circuit displayed an awareness of and respect for the 
Internet’s importance to modern life.76 But, as another academic 
incomplete Internet ban when defendant transported images that depicted him 
exploiting a minor). 
71 United States v. Wright, 529 Fed. Appx. 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2013).  
72 Id. 
73 See United States v. Atias, 518 Fed. Appx. 843, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(affirming conditions in a receipt case); United States v. Riley, 342 Fed. Appx. 
315, 319-20 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming release condition in a possession case); 
United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (disagreeing 
with the argument that mere possession was minor enough to render the ban 
unreasonable); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(appreciating the Sofsky and Freeman holdings but choosing to align with courts 
the held differently). 
74 See infra Part III.A-C. 
75 Adkins, supra note 31, at 264. 
76 See infra Part III.A. 
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notes (and later courts agree), since “new [web] pages are 
introduced onto the web every day, it would be practically 
impossible for a supervision officer to ensure” an Internet ban will 
effectively stem future exploitation if it is not complete.77 Circuit 
courts repeatedly grapple with these arguments when reviewing a 
condition for reasonableness. As discussed below, oftentimes 
courts rest their orders on these arguments. Thus, a practitioner 
should be prepared to make both arguments but he or she should 
focus on the importance argument, as it appears to be the more 
persuasive of the two. 
 
A.  Technology’s Importance Generally 
 
Circuits on all sides of the “consensus” recognize the 
importance of the Internet.78 Those Circuits participating in the 
“consensus” have given great weight to the importance of 
technology in reaching their conclusions. In Sofsky, the Second 
Circuit’s seminal decision relies heavily on its earlier decision in 
United States v. Peterson,79 a case where the defendant was 
convicted of larceny.80 Citing Peterson, the Sofsky court found an 
Internet ban unreasonable because: (1) “‘Internet access [has] 
become virtually indispensable in the modern world of 
communications and information gathering’”81 and (2) “[a] total 
ban on Internet access prevents use of e-mail, an increasingly 
widely used form of communication.”82 With both larceny and 
receiving child pornography, the Second Circuit thought it relevant 
to include a statement of the Internet’s importance. 
Unsurprisingly, the Third and Seventh circuits’ decisions used 
77 McKay, supra note 31, at 235; see also infra Part III.C. 
78 Compare United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2012), with 
United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Brigham is 
correct that computers and the internet have become significant and ordinary 
components of modern life as we know it . . . .”). 
79 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2002). 
80 Id. at 81. See also Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126. 
81 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (quoting Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83). 
82 Id. (drawing upon the Peterson Court’s assertion that telephone fraud 
could not warrant a telephone ban). 
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similar language.83 Surprisingly, a number of circuits not joining 
the supposed consensus also use similar language. In the Tenth 
Circuit, the court concluded that an Internet ban denying all access 
to the Internet was unreasonable because it “would bar [the 
defendant] from using a computer at a library to do any research, 
get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online.”84 The D.C. 
Circuit has used the Internet’s importance to strike down an 
Internet ban in, of all things, a child exploitation case by saying, 
“[i]t is hard to imagine white collar work in 2010 not requiring 
access to computers, just as white collar work 100 years ago would 
almost invariably have required the use of pens and pencils.”85 
Even the Ninth and Eleventh circuits, both aligned with the Fifth 
Circuit, recognize the Internet’s importance.86 With the early 
appearance and pervasiveness of this language, courts appear 
especially receptive to and respectful of this argument. Sentencing 
conditions are fertile ground for the importance argument. 
 
B.  Technology’s Defendant-Specific Importance 
  
Buttressing the persuasiveness of the general importance 
argument is the concurrent emergence of an alternative argument 
centered on how important the Internet is to the specific defendant. 
In United States v. Russell,87 the D.C. Circuit struck down a ban 
because of the defendant’s specific need of the Internet.88 There 
83 United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
it is “hard to imagine how Voelker could function in modern society” with the 
Internet ban imposed); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878-79 (7th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the Internet ban would not “allow him to function in the 
modern world” as the ban “is the early 21st century equivalent of forbidding all 
telephone calls, or all newspapers.”). 
84 United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that the 
incomplete Internet ban “leaves open the possibility that the probation office 
might unreasonably prevent [the defendant] from accessing one of the central 
means of information-gathering and communication in our culture today.”). 
85 United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
86 United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003). 
87 600 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
88 Id. at 637-38. 
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the defendant was an applied systems engineer and, “[b]ecause the 
computer restriction prevent[ed] [the defendant] from continuing 
in a field in which he ha[d] decades of accumulated academic and 
professional experience,” it was unreasonable.89 The court also 
found that even “blue collar” workers needed the Internet in their 
own way.90  
The First and Seventh circuits employ this defendant-specific 
analysis as well. In striking down a ban, the First Circuit noted that 
the Internet was especially important for the defendant to 
“transition from his prior employment as a teacher into a new and 
appropriate career.”91 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit found a 
condition unreasonable because the defendant, an information 
systems technologist, “is most likely to find gainful employment in 
the computer field upon his release, [thus] the conditions as 
currently written could affect his future productivity.”92 As these 
acknowledgements demonstrate, courts may be sympathetic 
toward defendants who need the Internet in a markedly unique 
way; that is, in a way other than common or recreational use.93 The 
emergence of this specific-importance argument could strengthen a 
practitioner’s importance argument. Moreover, this variant’s 
emergence underscores the importance argument’s singular value 
among Internet-based arguments.94 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 637 (providing, as examples, those that work at McDonald’s, keep 
inventory at PETCO, and produce frames at A.C. Moore). 
91 United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 72 (10th Cir. 2011). 
92 United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2003). 
93 This defendant-specific argument has a counterargument. If the offender 
has no specific need of the Internet then the ban may be maintained for that 
reason. See United States v. Granger, 117 Fed. Appx. 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(the court justified its upholding of the ban by saying that the defendant’s “work 
history involves manual labor”); United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 361 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (defendant’s “use of the Internet was not integrally connected to his 
profession as he was previously employed as a salesman and mechanic”).  
94 This defendant-specific argument can be made in conjunction with the 
argument that reintegration prevents recidivism. Having social, employment, 
and financial supports that are only possible with Internet access directly reduce 
future criminality. 
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C.  Technological Advances Requiring Greater Control 
 
A more recent, less individualized, and perhaps less persuasive 
argument attempts to combat the importance argument by 
maintaining that the Internet’s changeability actually requires a 
defendant’s supervisor to have greater control over the defendant’s 
Internet use. The D.C. Circuit, a court yet to issue a decision on the 
issue, has expressed concern that “the continuing development of 
the Internet makes it reasonable for the district court to give the 
[p]robation [o]fficer broad authority to determine the scope of [the 
defendant’s] permissible Internet use.”95 Since technology will 
undoubtedly change, said the D.C. Circuit, stripping the defendant 
of control allows a supervisory body to respond to the changes 
more appropriately.96 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, in contrast, saw 
this full-scale control-shifting as a reasonable way to respond to 
concerns that the inevitable evolution of technology would render 
an incomplete Internet ban unable to effectively stem any future 
exploitation attempted by the defendant.97 
What makes this argument truly relevant to practitioners, 
however, is that it has been utilized in numerous circuits. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. White,98 also 
expressed concern about effectively regulating Internet use when 
Internet technology changes so quickly.99 Though the White court 
ultimately struck down the Internet ban on the basis of the 
Internet’s importance, the Tenth Circuit warned sentencing courts 
to be aware of “the realities of the Internet and its rapidly changing 
technology.”100 Similarly, the Second Circuit upheld an incomplete 
ban when it thought a defendant might be able to circumvent less 
restrictive control measures with his advanced knowledge of the 
Internet.101 In 2001, the Second Circuit expressed a belief that any 
monitoring software that a court or probation officer would employ 
95 United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 133 (5th Cir. 2011). 
98 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). 
99 Id. at 1206; see also supra Part II.B. 
100 White, 244 F.3d at 1206. 
101 United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006). 
                                                                                                             
16
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol9/iss4/5
2014] SENTENCING COURT DISCRETION AND THE 365 
CONFUSED BAN ON INTERNET BANS 
might in fact fail to maintain pace with a defendant’s rapidly 
changing Internet knowledge if that person was “a sophisticated 
computer user.”102 The fears articulated by these circuits 
demonstrate how the Internet, as a complex (especially to less 
technologically savvy judges) and ever-developing technology, 
may scare courts into over-controlling a defendant. Although the 
importance argument, with its longevity and variations, is probably 
more persuasive, a technology argument that addresses both the 




The Sixth Circuit was correct when it said the per se 
disapproval of Internet bans “represents a close issue.”103 The 
Internet is of increasing importance to our daily lives, so trial 
courts should be limited in their discretion to prohibit its use. 
However the fact that Internet usage is increasing at all means that 
it will change, as it clearly has over the last decade of increased 
use. This reality might favor no limitation on courts’ discretion. 
Although the Sixth Circuit was wrong to say there is a consensus 
among the circuits as to whether a sentencing court is without the 
power to impose certain conditions upon supervised release, it 
correctly pinpointed an area for future litigation and persuasive 
sentencing arguments. For now, the potential for per se disapproval 
of Internet ban conditions is limited to sentencing in cases 
involving the electronic possession or distribution of child 
pornography, but this invasion into the court’s discretion and the 
defendant’s privacy might not stop there. If and when the invasion 
spreads, the nature-of-technology arguments, especially the 
importance-of-technology argument, might convince a judge in a 




 Defense attorneys should always object to Internet bans as 
102 Id. 
103 United States v. Wright, 529 Fed. Appx. 553, 588 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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conditions of supervised release during sentencing in order 
to receive the best standard of review: abuse of discretion. 
 Attorneys should consider using a more client-specific 
argument when addressing Internet restrictions. 
 Attorneys should prepare arguments, reference materials, 
and experts regarding both the importance and ever-
changing nature of technology for sentencing. 
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